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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to perform an extended Business Case Analysis 
(BCA) of the Versatile Depot Automated Test Station (VDATS).  The VDATS is a test 
station that implements the concept of the Agile Rapid Global Combat Support (ARGCS) 
by being an interoperable open architecture Automated Test Station (ATS) that can 
replace numerous legacy systems in a single (possibly joint) environment.  This paper 
develops a BCA through (1) consideration of the overall management of ATSs in the 
United States Air Force (USAF), (2) development of an Enterprise Architecture (EA) for 
the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center depot, and, (3) presenting an economic analysis 
to assess the potential for savings if the AF were to adopt VDATS in the Warner Robins 
Air Logistic Depot (WR-ALC).  We conclude there is a strong business case for VDATS 
as a common ATS in the WR-ALC and a further study should be performed to analyze 
potential savings at the other two AF depots. 
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A. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY 
The purposes of this thesis to develop an Enterprise Architecture (EA) for the 
Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR- ALC) depot, look at the overall management 
of Automated Test Stations (ATS) in the USAF, and to perform an extended Business 
Case Analysis for the WR-ALCs “To-Be” ATS the Versatile Depot Automated Test 
Station. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is facing the huge problem of supporting many 
weapons systems. The ATSs the DoD uses to keep today’s weapons in the fight are aging 
as technology passes them by. These legacy ATSs were not designed to be upgraded to 
meet future needs, but rather for a specific weapons system. The vast array of legacy 
ATSs has left us with hundreds of different (stovepipe) specialized systems that are 
becoming obsolete. It is estimated that DoD has over 400 different types of ATSs 
currently operating in the different services. These ATSs are used to diagnose problems 
with avionics and weapon system components. These components can be fixed at depots 
or at the I-level maintenance shops. Once the problem is diagnosed, the part can then be 
repaired, and either returned back to the original owner or put back into the supply 
system for future use. The average age for the AF-ATSs is 24 years. That is, many ATSs 
are well past their estimated operational life cycle and it is getting increasingly difficult to 
find repair parts.  A GAO report (2003) reported that the DoD “spent over $50 billion in 
its acquisition and support of ATE from 1980 through 1992, and the procurement was 
characterized by the proliferation of testers designed to support a specific weapon system 
or component. These testers are quickly becoming obsolete and more difficult and costly 
to maintain because they may no longer be in production, and parts may not be readily 
available.” (GAO, 2003, p. 8). 
The DoD’s preferred approach to solve this problem motivated the Agile Rapid 
Global Combat Support (ARGCS), an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
(ACTD). The ARGCS ACTD is an approved five year effort that addresses the war 
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fighters’ problems with all ATSs and future Joint ATS requirements. This same concept 
of jointness and open architecture led to the development of the Warner Robins Air 
Logistics Center (WR-ALC) automated test system called the Versatile Depot Automated 
Test Station (VDATS). As it happens, the VDATS implements many of the ARGCS 
concepts and will be addressed in the form of a Business Case Analysis (BCA) in this 
thesis. 
Major organizations have various IT governance processes, low level system 
architectures, and maybe an organizational chart to help manage everything. Most 
organizations fail to develop an overall EA to illuminate their structure and functions. 
One purpose of this thesis is to develop a high level “As-Is” EA for the WR-ALC depot 
to show how the organization functions with some of its various ATSs and how a “To-
Be” ATS (such as VDATS) would impact the mission of that organization.  
Next, management of ATSs is vital if the USAF is going to move toward true 
integration of systems. Our current strategy (or lack thereof) has left hundreds of 
stovepipe ATS that are proprietary and not interoperable. This thesis will identify the 
problem areas that have led to the vast array of stovepipe systems and offer a path to 





A. ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The acquisition of systems used for the Cold War worked very well and produced 
some of the best weapons systems in the world for those times; however, it was very 
expensive and took too long from concept to actual deployment. In today’s times with 
cutbacks, technology increasing at a faster rate, and the unpredictability of our 
adversaries, the old acquisition system will not work. In 1994 this was realized and a new 
acquisition approach to get the WarFighters critical needs faster was put in place called 
the Advance Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) process. This process was 
designed to be an early, fast, and inexpensive way to evaluate systems with advanced 
technology. It also was designed such that it could be easily integrated into the formal 
acquisition process if it was chosen to move forward.   
The concept of introducing new technologies to the WarFighter prior to the 
normal acquisition timeframe allowed technicians who have operational experience to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the new military utility. The evaluation results could then be 
used to better apply the technology and make appropriate adjustments so that the system 
being evaluated performed to the maximum or it was reviled that the system could not 
meet WarFighter needs. This ACTD process actually saved time and money because it 
was able to get systems to the field faster.  
The Joint WarFighter S&T Plan explains the following: ACTDs are 
designed to transfer technology rapidly from the developers to the users. 
They are user oriented and represent an integrated effort to assemble and 
demonstrate a significant, new or improved military capability that is 
based on mature advanced technologies. They are also on a scale large 
enough to demonstrate operational utility and end-to-end system integrity. 
A demonstration is jointly developed and implemented by the operational 
user and materiel development communities as key participants. ACTDs 
allow the WarFighter to:  
• Evaluate a technology's military utility before committing to a major 
acquisition effort.  
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• Develop concepts of operation for employing the new technology.  
• Retain a low-cost residual operational capability if the commander 
desires. 
There are three main areas of focus for ACTDs which are 1) users needs, 2) 
exploit mature technologies, and 3) potential effectiveness. The user’s needs are the main 
reason for the implementations of ACTDs. The ACTDs are developed to get users needed 
technology to the field faster than the formal acquisition process by focusing on those 
needs. In order to analyze requirements against proposed solutions then heavy user 
participation is needed for evaluation. The ACTD places mature technology in the work 
force to conduct numerous intense evaluations to gain knowledge and experience on that 
system. This process provides the users an evaluation method to make adjustments for 
operational requirements, thus meeting their needs. By moving forward in this matter it 
allows measures to be taken to ensure that all needed capability has been ultimately met. 
One key feature of the ACTD is to exploit mature technologies. Doing this lessens risks 
in the acquisition process and saves money. Finally, the ACTD results must be evaluated 
for military effectiveness. After evaluation, the ACTD will end in one of the following 
three ways. 
• Give the system directly to the WarFighter for execution. 
• Enter the formal acquisition process and an advanced milestone. 
• Terminate all efforts on the system or change them based on the results from 
the ACTD. 
In conclusion, the ACTD is a way of assisting the DOD’s formal acquisition 
process in order to meet critical requirements fast and effective with minimum risk of 
funds. A more in depth discussion of ACTDs and the JACTD by Kratzer can be found in 
Appendix A. 
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B. AUTOMATED TEST SYSTEMS AND AGILE GLOBAL COMBAT 
SUPPORT (ARGCS) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The US military has gone from each service operating autonomously to a focus on 
net centricity with jointness. Wordweb online defines “joint” to be “ the shape or manner 
in which things come together;” if you apply this to the military then one could derive the 
term jointness to mean how each branch of service in the DoD operates together, so the 
term jointness implies that future operations will be done together. In fact, the Joint Pub1-
02 defines joint as “Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements 
of two or more Military Department participate.” In the past operations have been 
independent and the budget of the military has been very large. With today’s cut backs 
and the do more with less attitude, the DoD must find better ways to develop systems and 
operate more efficiently.  
In today’s world of ever changing demands, logistics footprint, spares, manpower 
issues, duplication of system functionality, and interoperability are all problems areas that 
must be addressed. All of these affect our operations and ATSs. The war on terror has put 
high demands on the WarFighter which require joint activities world wide. Moving all of 
the support personnel and equipment is a tremendous effort that requires intense logistics. 
The logistics footprint the joint WarFighter contains a large repertoire of legacy systems, 
as is the cost of keeping spares on hand. This can entail having large (and expensive) 
inventories of parts and testers. Next come manpower issues. Legacy systems personnel 
must be trained on multiple systems. There is also duplication of system functionality 
among the legacy testers which has led to interoperability issues.  
In the past, one branch of service would deploy alone with its weapon system, 
support equipment, and personnel; however, today’s mission requires joint activities 
which puts different requirements on the WarFighter. In a joint environment sheer size of 
the support tail can be overwhelming in terms of troop movement, logistics, and cost. For 
joint operations, we deploy support equipment and personnel for each service and are left 
with support equipment for each independent system (duplication of systems). It is this 
duplication of stovepipe systems that is currently giving the DoD interoperability and 
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integrations issues. The reason there are so many legacy stovepipes is that each System 
Program Office acquires an ATS each time it adds a new capability for the WarFighter. 
In the past, having all of these ATS was not a major issue. But this mode of operation is 
poorly suited to staying abreast of technology, and reducing cost. Finally, the most 
important issue is that of interoperability. There is a specific ATS for each piece of 
equipment and they do not interoperate, nor do legacy testers operate in a joint 
environment. The DoD found that there was a huge ATS problem for the services.  
 After further investigation it found the following from the Agile Rapid Global 
Combat Support (ARGCS) Joint CONOPS (2006): 
Problem 1: Lack of interoperability between Services’ support equipment 
Lack of interoperability between Services’ support equipment prohibits 
integrated weapon system support necessary in today’s Joint Operational 
Environment. This includes limited interoperability between each 
Service’s Organizational, Intermediate and Depot maintenance levels. 
Problem 2: Support Equipment Not Available for Newly Fielded Weapon 
Systems 
War fighting capabilities are being fielded faster than the required support 
equipment can be fielded.  Support equipment sometimes lags introduction 
of weapon systems by several years. 
Problem 3: Closed System Limits Support Equipment Upgrades or 
Enhancements  
The performance of today’s weapon systems is quickly surpassing the 
technical capability of existing Combat Support Systems (CSS).  Much of 
today’s CSS physically cannot be upgraded to meet tomorrow’s weapon 
system performance requirements. 
Problem 4: High Support Costs  
Support costs are rising significantly as the hundreds of ageing DOD CSS 
(mostly designed in the ‘70s and ‘80s) become obsolete.  Advances in 
technology and the obsolescence of older equipment are driving many 
CSS toward major product improvements to continue supporting legacy 
weapon systems and implementing new test and diagnostic capability 
required by new weapon system designs.  
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Problem 5: Huge Logistic Footprints   
Proliferation of test system types and continued use of old technology 
drives huge logistic footprints (both weight and volume) which lengthens 
time to deploy and inflates required resources (spares, personnel, facilities 
and transportation).   
Problem 6: High False Failure Rates 
Existing combat support systems have high false failure rates (known by 
various terms such as CNV, NEOF, RTOK, and A799), which lead to 
unnecessarily high requirements for weapon system spares and 
overburdened manpower through unnecessary maintenance actions. 
(ARGCS Joint CONOPS, 2006, p. 1) 
 
The DoD identified all of these problems with ATSs and decided in 1994 that 
DoD policy on ATSs would encourage reducing the number of unique testers and moving 
toward a Family of Automated Test System (FATS). It is the FATS concept that has led 
to a five year approved ACTD called ARGCS which attempts to solve the short falls of 
ATSs in a joint environment. 
The ARGCS mission is defined by the Joint Concept of Operations (2006) “to 
provide a modular tester solution capability that is scalable, interoperable, common, and 
will facilitate fault isolation and repair of electronic components of major weapons 
systems.” (ARGCS Joint CONOPS, 2006, p. 5) The ARGCS ACTD is a promising 
approach toward fixing today’s problems in the DoD, and testing high tech concepts for 
military utility at modest cost. The ARGCS concept calls for future systems to be built 
with jointness in mind. This means new ATSs to test all types of equipment. (For 
example, the avionics box from the AF F-15 could hook up to the new tester and run its 
test. Next, the navy would hook up the F-18s avionics to the same tester and run its 
required test. This concept would provide true joint interoperability of ATSs.) 
The ARGCS system must also show that it is able coordinate and distribute 
maintenance records, document all fix actions, and make sure that all documentation is 
accessible in theater and out of theater of operations. Better documentation control will 
save time and money.  
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ARGCS is an open architecture concept that will be used with future joint service 
combat support systems. The ARGCS ATS system will not use proprietary tools and be 
opened ended systems. Commercial Off the Shelf Technology (COTS) will allow 
vendors to apply fixes and develop new ATS test program sets quickly. The ARGCS 
ACTD demonstrates this proof of concept.  
The ARGCS system will be evaluated against Critical Operational Issues (COI) 
taken from the ARGCS Joint CONOPS (2006) that are listed below: 
1. Does the ARGCS system provide the required compatibility 
between services support equipment, and interoperability necessary to 
exchange maintenance data between maintenance levels? 
2. Does ARGCS accommodate support equipment availability 
required to maintain newly fielded weapon systems? 
3. Can ARGCS be rapidly upgraded to support weapon system 
performance requirements? 
4. Does ARGCS system reduce operation and support costs?   
5. Does ARGCS reduce the logistic footprints (spares, size, and 
personnel)? 
6. Does ARGCS reduce high false failure rates? 
7. Is the ARGCS system usable and suitable for the WarFighter in its 
intended operational environment? 
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It is also important to show some of the Key Performance Parameters (KPP) from 
the ARGCS Joint CONOPS (2006) in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1.   KPP for the ARGCS System 
 
The ARGCS ATS will be a combination of COTS of integrated diagnostics and 
embedded diagnostics technologies that test digital, analog, and radio frequency avionics 
equipment for the WarFighter. The main key to this technology enabling interoperability 
will be a Common Test Interface (CTI). The CTI will be the interface between the new 
ARGCS system and the numerous legacy and newly acquired systems. The legacy 
systems Test Program Sets (TPS) (software that actually executes the avionics test) can 
run on the new ATS thus creating the common ATS framework. The system will also 
enable numerous new functional capabilities that will help improve the failure rate 
diagnosis, execution time, false pulls rates, and overall maintenance operations. 
According to the ARGCS Joint CONOPS (2006) the ARGCS system will address the 
following operational requirements. 
1. Interoperability: Open Architecture capacity 
a. Must be reconfigurable to support different systems 
b. Support multiple types of tests 
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c. Host legacy Test Program Sets 
d. Use a CTI for legacy and joint systems 
2. Net-Centric: potential for sharing 
a. Allow data to be accesses via the internet 
b. Provide analysis of trouble issues 
c. Ensure the most updated systems fix actions are available 
d. Interface in joint environment 
3. Reduction of logistics footprint 
a. Smaller systems 
b. Limited spares 
c. Low maintenance 
4. Speed & precision of fault diagnosis and repair ability 
a. Quick turn time on fix actions 
b. Fast fault diagnosis 
c. Low false pulls 
d. Data sharing access 
5. Use of synthetic instrumentation 
a. Use latest COTS synthetic instrumentation 
b. Common open architecture 
c. Upgradeable (ARGCS Joint CONOPS, 2006, p.10) 
As a result of the initiation of the ARGCS ACTD in 2002, with Northup 
Grumman and Boeing as contractors, it has been shown that the ARGCS concept 
requirements can be met.  Even though ARGCS is still an ACTD, the AF is currently 
pursuing an open architecture ARGCS concept tester that is named the Versatile Depot 
Test Station (VDATS). The VDATS is a future ATS that has the functionally to replace 
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the legacy tester at a ratio of one VDATS to two legacy testers. The VDATS idea came 
from the 742nd Combat Sustainment Group Depot at Robins AFB and will be explained 
below. 
C. WARNER ROBINS AIR LOGISTICS CENTER DEPOT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) Depot is the main avionics 
shop for the USAF. It is one of the biggest maintenance facilities that the USAF has in its 
inventory and houses hundreds of Automated Test Systems (ATS). The background and 
mission is explained below from the 402 EMXG/MXVOPE and WR-ALC/FMC 
Economic Analysis (2005). 
WR-ALC is the Avionics Center for the Air Force and was designated the 
Electrical Components, ATS, Radars, and Airborne Electronics 
Technology Repair Center (TRC). The incredible pace of Technology 
changes presents a continuing challenge to replace obsolete and out-of-
production components in the TRC in order to support the many systems 
fielded twenty years ago. It is also necessary to keep our workforce trained 
and equip our repair systems so that they can accommodate the new, ever-
changing technology. (402 EMXG/MXVOPE and WR-ALC/FMC 
Economic Analysis, 2005, p.1)”  
 
The WR-ALC performs test on both common and unique avionics for more than 
260 weapon systems and numerous components. They work on many Shop Replaceable 
Units and Line Replaceable Units from all of the various electrical components. The 
technology they work on ranges from the 1960’s through the 2005’s and continuously 
requires a vast array of equipment and components. The average age for their testers is 
24-25 years old with the oldest being purchased in the 1960s. The skill set and parts 
required to maintain these components is getting harder to find with technology being 
outdated and often requires reverse engineering to perform fix actions. The electrical 
blueprint on approximately 120 of these testers is currently outdated, which makes them 
difficulty to sustain thus again requiring reverse engineering. The depot is not always 
able to meet its mission requirements because when one tester goes down the parts are 
just too hard to find and in some cases they must be custom made. 
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In order to mitigate problems affecting the depot and outdated testers the depot 
decided to design a tester that would meet its badly needed total requirements. The tester 
that the depot came up with was the Versatile Automated Test Station (VDATS). The 
VDATS is an open architecture commercial off the shelf technology tester that will 
replace legacy testers at a ratio of one VDATS per two or more legacy testers. VDATS is 
currently under development and in meeting the ARCGS concept requirements. 
D. ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern organizations have become extraordinarily complex and very hard to 
manage. So leaders have looked for new ways to manage. One of the best current 
methods to manage complex development is the use of the Enterprise Architecture (EA). 
The term enterprise is defined by Webster’s as “an organization created for business 
ventures.” And the Department of Defense Integrated Architecture Panel (1995) defines 
architecture as “the structure of components, their relationships, and the principles and 
guidelines governing their design and evolution over time.” By looking at these two 
definitions we can conclude that an EA would be the structure of a business and the 
interactions of its components. Current industry uses EA methodology as a management 
tool and has shown excellent returns. It is because of the benefits seen in industry that the 
DoD has now mandated the use of EA.  
The National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2005 prescribes the establishment 
of Investment Review under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and requires 
the Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) to develop a Business 
Enterprise Architecture (BEA) to guide and constrain DoD business system investments 
and a transition plan to implement the architecture.  
The BEA is an Enterprise-level architecture that reflects corporate DoD priorities 
and requirements for business systems, and provides a common framework to ensure that 
key information is available to DoD decision-makers Department-wide. The BEA is 
developed and maintained by the Business Transformation Agency (BTA), which reports 
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to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD 
(AT&L)), and serves the interests of the entire Business Mission Area (BMA) of the 
DoD.  
The BEA also contains a set of integrated Department of Defense Architecture 
Framework (DoDAF) operations, systems, and technical standard views, which depict 
specific, high priority Business Enterprise Priorities (BEPs) that align to strategic 
transformational capabilities identified by the business enterprise leadership. The BEA is 
a critical component of the Investment Review Board (IRB) process and is to be used at 
each level of investment review to assess whether business investments going through the 
certification process support DoD Enterprise priorities and requirements. Summary 
results of these investment reviews are reported annually to Congress.  
DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) version 1.5 (2007) explains architecture 
in the DoD by saying: 
Architectures within the Department of Defense (DoD) are created for a 
number of reasons. From a compliance perspective, the DoD is compelled 
by law and policy (i.e., Clinger-Cohen Act, Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) Circular A-130) to develop architectures. From a practical 
perspective, experience has demonstrated that the management of large 
organizations employing sophisticated systems and technologies in pursuit 
of joint missions demands a structured, repeatable method for evaluating 
investments and investment alternatives, implementing organizational 
change, creating new systems, and deploying new technologies. Towards 
this end, the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) was established as a 
guide for the development of architectures.  
The DoDAF provides the guidance and rules for developing, representing, 
and understanding architectures based on a common denominator across 
DoD, Joint, and multinational boundaries. It provides external 
stakeholders with insight into how the DoD develops architectures. The 
DoDAF ensures that architecture descriptions can be compared and related 
across programs, mission areas, and ultimately, the enterprise, thus, 
establishing the foundation for analyses that supports decision-making 
processes throughout the DoD. (DoDAF, 2007, p. XIV) 
 
The importance of architecture is vitally necessary for a system to meet the joint 
DoD requirements. The architecture provides a foundation for DoD to create one 
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common framework. The common framework also functions as a management for 
missions, system interfaces, technical guidelines, technology constraints, and activities 
that systems perform. Finally, it provides data in the form of views and in the words of 
Patrick Davidson “In God We Trust, but everyone else must have data.” 
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III. WARNER ROBINS-AIR LOGISTIC CENTER ENTERPRISE 
ARCHITECTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The DoD currently has a major problem with supporting multiple weapons 
systems in all domains. The ATSs the DoD currently uses to keep today’s weapons in the 
fight are aging and obsolescent. These legacy ATSs were not designed to be upgraded to 
meet future capabilities but rather for the specific weapons system at hand. In all, the vast 
array of legacy ATSs has left the DoD with hundreds of stovepipe systems that 
technological progress has left behind. It is estimated that the DoD has over 400 different 
types of ATSs in use through the different services. The DoD is currently trying to move 
toward a common ATS through initiative such as the ARGCS ACTD. The AF depot 
system is trying follow through implementation of an ARGCS concept system called the 
Versatile Automated Test Station (VDATS).  
The following Enterprise Architecture (EA) is the architecture for Warner Robins-
Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) Depot. This EA, among other things, is intended to 
reveal any duplicative functionality among AF depot legacy ATSs, how the VDATS fits 
into the ARGCS picture, if there are organizational flaws in the way that the AF currently 
manages its ATSs, and flaws in the current ATS Procurement Process. The EA that 
follows was developed using the Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
(DoDAF) guidance and consist of the following views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, SV-1, SV-5, 
OV-5, SV-8, SV-9, TV-1, TV-2, OV-4. 
B. PRESENTATION OF WR-ALC & VDATS EA IN A BUSINESS VALUE 
ADDED FORM 
The depot at Warner Robins has two hundred and sixty different ATS’s 
representing one hundred and fifty different configurations. The average ATS age at 
Warner Robins is twenty four years. The VDATS was designed to replace the legacy 
testers and is currently targeted to replace one hundred legacy ATS units with fifty 
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VDATS (with an associated footprint, power, and training reduction). Each legacy ATS 
is designed to test one specific piece of equipment.  
One point to be noted is that EA shows how the various systems support the over 
all mission of the organization. It also shows how the systems touch the various 
components that the organizations must deal with to enable the completion of the 
mission. It is very crucial in EA to be able to view a complete enterprise if the EA is to be 
an effective tool for decision making. 
The OV-1 below in Figure 2 is an “As-Is” High Level Operational Concept View 
which displays the mission of the WR-ALC. The OV-1 shows three AF aircraft on the 
bottom left having their avionics repaired by three different ATSs thus allowing them to 
fly and put bombs on target. The main take away from the OV-1 is that there are three 
different ATSs hooked up to the three different aircraft, one for each plane. Remember 
that the depot has over two hundred and sixty different ATSs which have led to a 
logistics footprint over sixteen acres of climate controlled buildings. 
 
Figure 2.   The As-Is High level Operational Concept View (OV-1) 
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The ARGCS concept is represented below in Figure 3 by using the WR-ALC Depot “To-
Be” OV-1. There are the three aircraft depicted on the bottom left as before in the legacy 
OV-1; however, there is now only one ATS, the VDATS that can take over the 
functionality of hundreds of different types of legacy ATSs. This leads to a reduction in 
footprint, power, training, and duplication of systems. This is a huge breakthrough in the 
ATS environment which implements DoD policy, requires a new way of thinking, and a 
new approach for developing test equipment. 
 
Figure 3.   WR-ALC Depot To-BE OV-1 
 
In order to look at the organizational interfaces of the depot we will look at the 
Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2), here in figure 4 below. The OV-2 
shows a subset of the various organizations that the depot works with operationally. The 
organizations that the depot interfaces with are listed in the form of operational nodes 
with informational need lines attached. The representation that the OV-2 gives is very 
important in order to display a complete organizational operating picture. These nodes 
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are also used in other various EA views to form a truly integrated architecture. By 
keeping views related it allows for the full enterprise to be represented and then 
ultimately managed. (A good example would be to trace the VDATS from a Systems 
View back up to the OV-2 to see what external organizations that the VDATS would 
impact.) 
 
Figure 4.   WR-ALC Depot Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2) 
 
The OV-2, also, shows need lines from the depot to other operational nodes. 
These need lines represent that a need for the depot to communicate to these nodes. Now 
the Operational Information Exchange Matrix (OV-3) below in Figure 5 shows the 
internal information of the need lines and what nodes and activities in the depot use that 
information. (This data could be used to make decisions on the impacts of a new system 
or removing a legacy system from inventory.) 
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Figure 5.   WR-ALC Depot Operational Information Exchange Matrix (OV-3) 
 
The OV-3 above displays the need line identifier number, the producing 
node/receiving node from the OV-2 and the producing activity/receiving activity from the 
OV-5 as well as the frequency/timeliness that information is needed. This type of 
information is critically needed in order to really see how a new system can impact an 
organization. 
Next, we have the As-Is Systems Interface Description (SV-1) in Figure 6 which 
displays an example of six different digital and analog depot ATSs that support five 
different types of equipment.  
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Figure 6.   As-Is Systems Interface Description (SV-1) 
 
As the SV-1 depicts, there is the duplication of functionality between these ATSs and that 
is a problem for logistics, sustainability, training, and many other reasons. The depot to 
trying to mitigate the issues mentioned thus far by following DoD policy and moving 
toward the ARGCS concept. 
The ARGCS implementation concept can be seen below in Figure 7 in the 
VDATS context. Here in the WR ALC “To-Be” SV-1 the VDATS operational 
connections to the various pieces of equipment show how one system (VDATS) takes on 
the functionality of several legacy systems. This SV-1 shows the general connectivity 
between the system nodes and also that there are some needed interfaces between them in 
the form of need lines. One ATS is depicted connected up to multiple pieces of legacy 
equipment thus reducing duplication among ATSs and the logistics footprint where as in 
the legacy SV-1 each pieces of equipment had its own ATS.  
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Figure 7.   WR-ALC “To-Be” SV-1 for VDATS 
 
The SV-1 in Figure 7 also shows the intra-nodal connections between the various Line 
Replacement Units (LRU), the Shop Replaceable Units (SRU) with their respective need 
lines, the VDATS digital, and analog tester’s subsystems. The need lines show that there 
is information being passed between the intra-nodal subsystems and is defined as test 
signal analog, test signal digital, test response digital, and test response analog. This SV-1 
is a great visual representation of how the VDATS is one system with a family of 
subsystems vice the “As-Is” SV-1 mentioned earlier. The VDATS implements the 
ARGCS concept which is the goal of the DoD policy. 
One of the main purposes of this architecture was to show that there is duplication 
among different ATS in the depot and Figure 8 below shows this. The SV-5 in Figure 8 
below is the Operational Activity to System Function Traceability Matrix. It shows the 
equipment to be tested across the top and the ATS that is doing the testing along the side.  
By looking at the chart you can see that each piece of equipment that has to be tested has 
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an associated digital/analog legacy tester with it. These are the legacy stovepipes that are 
holding the AF back and consuming so much time and money. Next, as displayed at the 
very bottom of Figure 8, VDATS can perform all of the tests that the legacy systems can 
thus eliminating the duplication. This thesis shows a sample of testers that could be 
replaced and that is all that was required for a conclusion to be reached.  
 
Figure 8.   As-Is and To-Be Comparison (SV-5) 
 
With hundreds of different types of ATS, there are hundreds of different types of 
activities that must be done in order to test equipment. Moving to an ARGCS concept 
allows maintainers to only learn a limited number of activities in order to perform the 
various tests because they are using a common tester. This approach is one of the first AF 
approaches to business process standardization and integration for future ATSs. The 
VDATS could be used as an example to create a standard process for running ATSs.  
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By looking at the WR-ALC Depot Operational Activity Model OV-5 below in 
Figure 9, using the IDEF0 format, you can see the activity “A0 - VDATS Performing 
Test” has the following: 
1. Input of an untested aircraft avionics. 
2.  Constraints in the form of Operating Instructions and Standards. 
3. Mechanism in the form of test equipment and test personnel 
4. The outputs of tested equipment and test reports 
This level 1 standard process if followed for all future avionics testing and will 
lead to the long term strategy of ARGCS concept implementation, thus eliminating future 
stovepipes.  
 
Figure 9.   WR-ALC Depot Operational Activity Model (OV-5) 
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Decomposing the OV-5 down a level produces Figure 10 below, the “A0 Depot 
Testing Steps.” This level 2 activity diagram represents the sub activities that are 
performed inside the parent activity the A0. All avionics could use this same process of 
being tested through their lifecycle. The only difference is that each different piece of 
avionics may have different operating instructions and standards. The main idea here is to 
standardize processes and integration of systems.  
 
Figure 10.   A0 Depot Testing Steps (OV-5) 
 
Now let’s look at the way the OV-5 relates to the OV-2. This is done in the Level 
3 decomposition listed in Figure 11 below where VDATS is shown actually performing 
the Digital/Analog test on the AAS-35 equipment, and then those results are released 
back up to higher activities ultimately ending up back in the hands of an external 
organization in the OV-2. The input could be any piece of equipment which VDATS has 
had the Test Program Set (TPS) offloaded.  
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VDATS is scheduled to replace 100 different TPSs, with associated savings. With 
the VDATS having an open architecture and plug and play concept, all the operator 
would have to do is just load the TPS on another in house VDATS and start testing, this 
is true interoperability, standardization, and flexibility should one VDATS unit go out of 
service. 
 
Figure 11.   AO.2.1 Execute Test (OV-5) 
 
The family of DoDAF products allows users to manage their complete business 
and the way it changes from time to time. One key thing that the VDATS Program Office 
needs to do is keep up with when they expect VDATS to take over the legacy system 
functionality. This can be accomplished by using the System Evolution Description (SV-
8). The VDATS SV-8 is below in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.   WR-ALC System Evolution Description (SV-8) 
 
The SV-8 here shows transition dates for the new VDATS to subsume the legacy 
functionality. By using the SV-8, portfolio managers can see when legacy systems will be 
shut down so they can reallocate those funds else where. The use of EA in this manner 
truly covers all aspects of an enterprise and allows good decision making.  
Most program offices forget to consider how technology will impact their legacy 
systems, standards they currently operate on, and the future standards that are coming. 
This lack of thinking has put the DoD where it is today with all of the outdated legacy 
systems. The DoDAF provides the System Technology Forecast (SV-9), the Technical 




Figure 13.   WR-ALC Systems Technology Forecast (SV-9) 
 
The SV-9 in Figure 13 above shows that VDATS will be ready to be released to 
the depot in FY08 with all of the legacy functionality listed in the SV-8. Next, you will 
notice that there are the two Advance Concept Technology Developments (ACTD) listed. 
One is from Northup Grumman and the other is from Boeing; however, they both 
stemmed from the ARGCS concept of one tester that can service a family of different 
types of equipment in the joint environment. One of the main keys to making this concept 
reality is to know what standards apply to what equipment.  
With technology changing at an ever fast pace it is important that the AF keep up 
with standards that affect its ATSs. Managing the standards that apply to systems now 
and tomorrow it will allow the AF to head off future potential shortfalls that the 
WarFighter could otherwise experience. The DoDAF TV-1 in Figure 14 below, assists in 




Figure 14.   WR-ALC Technical Standards Profile (TV-1) 
 
It is also very important to know what future standards will affect our systems. 
Our acquisition system has improved over the years; however, since it still takes many 
years to acquire a system thus making it even more important to know what standards the 
future holds. The document that the DoDAF defines for maintaining standards forecast is 




Figure 15.   WR-ALC Technical Standards Forecast (TV-2) 
 
C. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ARCHITECTURE FOR ATS’S 
The DoD realized there were problems with ATS proliferation in 1994 and since 
then the DoD has actively sought to reduce the number of unique testers and move 
towards commonality, consistent with the ARGCS concept. This policy led to the 
mandate that all AF System Program Offices (SPOs) go through the AF ATS Program 
Management Office (PMO) for approval of acquisition before buying ATSs. However, 
this process is rarely followed and there are currently no means to enforce policy. The 
current AF Operational Activity Model (OV-5) for procurement of ATSs is shown below 
in Figure 16 represented as a flow diagram. 
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Figure 16.   AF “As-Is” Operational Activity Model (OV-5) (From: ATS Program 
Management Office) 
 
The process in Figure 16 depicts the currents process that the AF uses to purchase 
ATSs. To begin with in the acquisition phase (new requirement box), a new need for an 
ATS in the Initial Capabilities document (ICD). Next, that document is given to the SPO; 
the SPO in turn develops the Level of Repair Analysis (LORA) and Test Requirements -- 
generally in the form on a Supporting Equipment Requirements Document (SERD) 
prepared with contractor assistance. The SERD is then given to the ATS PO who then 
queries the SERD against the System Synthesis Model (SSM) to see if there is a common 
system that already exists to meet the requirements. If so, then the SPO must use that 
common tester. If there is a common tester that does not meet the TPS requirements, but 
does meet the hardware requirements, then the SPO should have the contractor develop 
Test Program Sets specifically for the existing tester. If no common tester matches the 
SERD in anyway, then the next step is to see if there is a COTS solution. If there is a 
COTS solution, then the SPO must prepare a Commercial Tester Acquisition Verification 
Request (CTAVR) waiver and the SPO may then purchase the COTS unit. If there is not 
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a COTS solution then the next step is to try and modify an existing ATS, if this can be 
done then the SPO pays the contractor to make the modification; otherwise, the SPO is 
forced to undertake a new development. 
The SPO should have a unique tester developed only as a last resort. However, 
because the ATS PMO does not have oversight of the ATS appropriated funds at the 
SPO, it allows the SPO to bypass all steps and purchase their own unique tester without 
notifying the ATS PMO. The current organizational structure for the flow is money is 
presented below in Figure 17 below in the form of a Legacy OV-4. 
 
Figure 17.   Legacy OV-4, the organizational structure for the flow of money to SPOs. 
 
As is evident, the ATS PMO is organizationally disconnected from the flow of authority. 
This lack of ATS PMO authority has led to the AF having over 350 stovepipe legacy 
ATSs. The number 350 is what the ATS PO knows about at this time; however, it is 
likely there are more ATSs that have not yet been identified. As shown in Figure 17, 
there is no way to hold the SPO accountable to guidance from the ATS PO. If the SPO is 
denied the right to purchase the requested tester with one color of money then the SPO 
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knows how to use other colors to ensure that the SPOs preferred tester is purchased 
without the ATS PO even knowing. The purposed way to mitigate the problems that the 
AF currently has with its ATS management policy is to add a Program Element Manager 
(PEM) at the Air Staff level to work with the various weapons systems PEMs for 
approval of ATS. Figure 18 depicts the new organizational structure in the form of a “To-
Be” OV-4. 
 
Figure 18.    “To-Be” OV-4 (Organizational chart) 
 
Figure 18 shows a way to correct the problem shown in Figure 17. When SPOs have a 
new requirement for an ATS, then the weapons system PEM must pass this requirement 
to the ATS PEM; the ATS PEM would then work with the ATS PO to map those 
requirements to a common tester or grant appropriate waivers. Figure 19 below 
represents the future procurement process which would ensure that all new ATSs 
procurement would flow through the ATS PMO for review. 
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Figure 19.   “To Be” ATS Procurement Process, with ATS PEM Involvement. (After: 
Program Management Office) 
 
It is very important to keep the ATS PMO notified of all new ATS procurements. 
ATS management was not a concern in the past thus led to the vast array of ATS in 
inventory today; however, with the cost of ATSs running the DOD “over $50 Billion in 
acquisition and support from 1980 through 1992,” (GAO, 2003, p. 8).it is now a priority 
in the DoD and must be embraced by the senior leadership in the AF. 
D. HOW EA SUCCESS AND BUSINESS VALUE IS MEASURED 
The success of EA methods can be measured in many ways ranging from 
customer surveys, savings from various projects, and how well the EA gets organizations 
working on the same “playing field”. It is very important in today’s business environment 
to ensure that the organization is collectively working towards the same strategic goal, 
and the EA above will do just that. Management must also be able to look at the 
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architecture and see how the organization functions, what systems support those 
functions, and how a new systems might affect that organization. The EA prepared for 
this project revealed the following:  
1. The mission of the depot and a subset of systems that support it. 
2. There was duplication amongst legacy ATSs (shown in the SV-5) 
3. VDATS fits into the ARGCS concept thus making the depot compliant 
with the DoD mandate to move toward a family of testers 
4. Reduction of the logistics footprint (OV-2 shows VDATS servicing 
multiple legacy equipment) 
5. VDATS is interoperable by being able to test multiple types of equipment 
is the OV-2, SV-8, OV-5, SV-5, and OV-1. 
6. There is an organizational flaw in the way that the AF has currently 
structured its ATS Program Management Office (PMO) and Procurement 
Process. 
a. The “As-Is” & ”To-Be” OV-4 show this for the ATS PMO 
b. The “As-Is” &”To-Be” OV-5 show this for the Procurement 
Process. 
The business value the EA has streamed lined the depots established baseline of 
what it currently does. It shows how future ATSs could affect the depot mission and 
current systems. The EA also established the “As-Is” & “To-Be” Business Behavior of 
the Procurement Process. It is this “As-Is” baseline that helps AF leadership understands 
where their problems lie in the management of the ATS Procurement Process. At the 
same time, the EA offers a way to fix the process by defining a path for the future. The 
EAs ability to do these things in a clear presentation will allow transformation and 
alignment with DoD architecture mandates. 
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E. LIMITATIONS OF THE WR-ALC EA AND NEXT STEPS 
While the WR-ALC EA did meet its intended purpose, one of its limitations is 
that it is very high level architecture. The next steps in completing the EA would be to 
show the following: 
1. All organizations that the depot interfaces with using detailed need lines. 
2. Map out legacy system functionality to operational node connectivity to 
see what organizations are affected by what testers. This would allow the 
depot to see where VDATS could further be used. 
3. Create a repository so that all organizations could understand the depot 
architecture. 
In order to ensure that the depot enterprise moves forward it is critical that the 
architecture be used and the above actions completed. EA is not meant to be used just for 
funding; therefore, it must be maintained and used as a tool to aide in management 
decisions to move the enterprise forward in order to meet strategic objectives. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the WR-ALC EA has been presented in a value added fashion to 
show:  
1. What the depot mission is. 
2. Subset of systems that support that mission. 
3. Problem areas that constrain the management and procurement of ATSs. 
4. Problems with the legacy ATSs.  
The problems and solutions with the management and procurement of ATSs were 
explained in Figures 16-19. If the solutions are implemented correctly this could mitigate 
the current ATS problems and prevent it from happening again. With that said, the 
problems that the depot is facing with ATSs must be resolved. The VDATS is a prime  
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solution that will resolve the depot problems and also implement DoD policy using the 
ARGCS concept of a family of ATSs. The VDATS fulfills the ARGCS requirements in 
the following ways: 
1. Reduces the logistics footprint, i.e. scalable 
2. Able to take on the role of various legacy systems reducing ATSs, i.e. 
interoperable  
3. Uses open architecture standards thus ultimately allowing each VDATS to 
be a back up of itself, i.e. common framework and agility. 
5. Implementation of COTS resources where possible. 
6. Open architecture thus allowing repair of electronic components by all 
vendors. 
 
The VDATS system was designed specifically to test all type of electronics that 
could be used in the development of avionics. It has been shown using the various 
architecture views how the VDATS will reduce legacy systems and impact the various 
organizations. Thus far the VDATS has performed above and beyond initial expectations.  
It is believed that VDATS will change the way that the AF approaches any new 




IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Warner Robins-Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) Depot completed an 
Economic Analysis titled “Common Testers and Software Translation Tool (CTST), 
Phase III. (2005).” to see if it was appropriate to begin up grading their Automated Test 
Equipment in FY09 or FY10. They developed two alternatives using constant FY05 (base 
year) dollars inflated to the FY09 program year dollars that have different time periods 
and implementations, but with the same end results. Alternative A would begin in FY10 
and take three years to implement, while alternative B would begin in FY09 and take 2 
years to implement. The following Extended Economic Analysis is an extension of the 
WR-ALC economic analysis. The time period between FY09 and FY12 is critical 
because those are the years in which there are significant differences between the two 
alternatives. This analysis and the one by WR-ALC used the assumptions stated in 
Appendix A.  However, This section will take the WR-ALC economic analysis a step 
further to address the following: 
1. Operating Cost Reduction Worksheet 
2. One-time (Non-recurring) Cost Worksheet 
3. On-going (Recurring) Cost Worksheet 
4. Total Savings 
5. Internal Rate of Return. 
One of the main findings in this Analysis, Table 1 and Table 2, is that comparison 
of alternatives hinges upon the first four years of the projects. This is because all cost 
associated with both alternatives are the same after the first four years. The reason that 
the costs are not the same in the first four years is due to different program schedules. 
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Table 1.   Recurring Cost for Alternative A FY09 dollars (From: CTST Phase III) 
 
 
Table 2.   Recurring Cost for Alternative B FY09 dollars (From: CTST Phase III) 
 
One of the most important components of system life cycle cost is the recurring 
costs to operate and maintain that system. Table 3 below considers the difference 
between the recurring cost of Alternatives A and B for Maintenance Cost, Electrical 
Power, and Calibration. In FY09, there are negative numbers due to paying for the 
implementation of alternative B while also paying for sustainment of forty four legacy 
systems. In FY10 both alternatives are the same because Alternative A implements the 
new system and pays for sustainment of forty legacy systems just like alternative B, thus 
the zero value. The real savings start in FY11 and continue through FY12. The main 
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savings in FY11 and FY12 occur with Alternative B because Alternative A takes longer 
to implement and must pay for continuing sustainment of the legacy systems. Past FY12 
Alternatives A & B have the same values. Table 3 below reveals that Alternative B 
lowers operating cost and saves $5M in just four years. 
 
 
Table 3.   Operating Cost reduction Worksheet for implementing alternative B FY09 dollars 
(After: CTST Phase III) 
 
The worksheet, Table 4 below, identifies the non-recurring cost of both 
alternatives. These non-recurring costs are made up of labor and equipment. The labor 
and equipment cost shown are associated with the one time investment cost for transfer 
test program sets to the new Automated Test System (ATS) and the actual twenty two 
pieces of ATS/Interface Test Adapter (ITA) equipment. Table 4 shows that Alternative B 
is $8.5M (25%) cheaper.  
 
 
Table 4.   Economic Benefits of Non-recurring cost of New system FY09 dollars (After: 
CTST Phase III) 
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Next, it is important to consider the recurring cost for both alternatives for the 
four years in which they are different (FY09-12). Table 5 shows that alternative B is 200k 
cheaper. 
 
Table 5.   Recurring cost for both alternatives FY09 dollars (After: CTST Phase III) 
 
In order to completely understand the benefits of Alternative B we must 
summarize the various savings. It is extremely important to remember that both 
alternatives end up with the same solution; however, they are implemented over different 
time frames – which drive the savings associated with Alternative B. The total savings 
can be seen in Table 6 below, by taking the total from the cost reduction and adding it to 
the difference between the non-recurring cost and the recurring cost. The end result is 





Table 6.   Total Savings provided by alternative B FY09 dollars (After: CTST Phase III) 
 
Finally, we must look at the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for both alternatives to 
find out which is the best value. In order to compute the IRR you must remember that the 
only difference between alternative A and B are exactly the first four years. Table 7 
below shows that the IRR is 42% which makes option B the best solution for the problem 
of upgrading the ATSs. If you just compare FY09 and FY10 the IRR is still 31% which 
again makes alternative B the best solution. 
 
 
Table 7.   IRR of Alternative B (relative to A, $M). (After: CTST Phase III) 
 
In conclusion, when looking at the problem that the WR-ALC Depot is facing, 
this extension economic analysis concludes that Alternative B is the better solution. The 
Air Force will save an estimated $5M over these four years in operating cost, $200k in 
recurring cost, and almost $8.5M in initial funding over alternative A. The total savings 
alternative B offers over alternative A is $14M over four years. And, these results are 
captured in the IRR of 42% for Alternative B (vs. A). 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the problems that the DoD is having with ATSs is currently being 
mitigated through the ARGCS concept requirements. The WR-ALC is trying to achieve 
ARGCS capabilities AF through the use of VDATS. The WR-ALC Enterprise 
Architecture (EA) offered here reveals a duplication of functionality within ATSs in the 
AF, organizational flaws in the way that ATSs are managed, and current ATS 
procurement processes that could be improved.  It also presented solutions to each of 
these problems through the use of VDATS to reduce duplication of functionality, and 
associated change in practices to manage the new ATS concepts, as well as restructuring 
procurement processes to manage ATS purchasing to avoid costly duplications. Finally, 
the best method to address the current ATS problem is through a structured approach that 
features careful attention to enterprise architecture and the use of BCAs (and EAs).  
Next, the Economic Analysis (EA) has shown that VDATS has an outstanding 
return on investment and thus should be implemented elsewhere in the AF. The total 
saving that the WR-ALC depot alone will see in just four years will be $14M with and 
IRR of 42%. The AF has two other depots not yet analyzed which face the same 
problems. The numbers of ATSs at these depots are not readily available at this time, 
which reveals difficulties in current Air Force ATS management practices. Analyses 
using the methods employed here for those two depots to determine what savings may be 
found using ARGCS concepts (such as VDATS) should be accomplished by a future 
study. 
In short, this study strongly indicates that the best approach to improving ATS 
management is to manage the Enterprise through using Enterprise architecture and 
quantitative analysis; establish an ATS PEM at the Air Staff level (Figure 18); and 
restructure the ATS Procurement Process in accordance (Figure 19), and finally 
implement the VDATS in the WR-ALC. 
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APPENDIX A. A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH FOR 
CONDUCTING A BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS FOR THE 
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY ORDNANCE SURVEILLANCE 
ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION BY 
KRATZER 
A. KRATZER STUDY 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has seen the need to change the way that it 
acquires its new technologies. The Kratzer (2005) feels that 
budget constraints, significant changes in threats, and an accelerated pace 
of technology development have challenged the ability of the Component 
Commanders (COCOMs) to adequately respond rapidly to the evolving 
military needs. Part of the Department of Defense response to the 
challenges has been to initiate the Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration program in early 1994 to get new technologies into the 
hands of the WarFighter as quickly as possible. 
The ACTD program is designed to assist the DoD acquisition process 
adapt to today’s economic and threat environments. ACTDs identify 
significant military needs and match them to mature technologies or 
technology demonstration programs which are maturing key technologies 
in order to solve important military needs (see Figure 2). These 
technologies are then combined and integrated into a complete military 
capability to provide decision makers an opportunity to understand fully 
the operational potential offered by a proposed new military capability 
before making an acquisition or sustainment decision. This goal is met by 
developing fieldable prototypes of the proposed capability and providing 
those prototypes to the WarFighter for evaluation of that capability. The 
WarFighter evaluates the capability in real military exercises and at a scale 
sufficient to assess fully military utility. During the ACTD, the 
WarFighter also evolves the broad statement of need, which existed at the 
start of the ACTD, into a definitive set of operational requirements that 
can support a follow-on acquisition. At the completion of the ACTD, the 
prototypes used in the evaluation process are left with the WarFighter to 




ACTD Development Process (From ACTD 2004). 
In a February 24, 2005 article in Inside the Pentagon, titled “DOD Plans 
New Acquisition Executive Post To Champion Joint Programs,” plans 
were announced on establishing the policies for ACTDs and JCTDs.  
The Pentagon plans to establish a new acquisition executive to champion 
technologies and concepts designed for joint operations, according to 
defense officials and documents.  
The creation of the new position is part of a wider effort to overhaul the 
advanced  concept technology demonstration program -- the 
Pentagon's marquee project for  rapidly fielding new technologies -- 
into another effort called the joint capability  technology demonstration 
program.  
The goal is to expedite deliveries of new technologies to soldiers, sailors, 
airmen and Marines by putting in place new funding mechanisms and 
organizations to  make sure new, proven weapons and combat 
technologies are designed for use by more than one service and not 
orphaned by individual services at budget time.  
Beginning Oct. 1, the Pentagon plans to have in place the new acquisition 
executive to ensure "cradle to grave" funding and advocacy for promising 
technologies that do not have clear champions in the Army, Navy, Air 
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Force or Marines. This new post would be equal in rank to the service 
acquisition executives, according to Defense Department officials.  
To facilitate this undertaking the Office of the Secretary of Defense has 
shifted $40 million in its fiscal year 2006 budget proposal from the ACTD 
budget line to initiate JCTD programs.  
"This is just seed money," said Mark Peterson, head of program resources 
and integration for the deputy under secretary of defense for advanced 
systems and concepts, in a Feb. 22 interview. "We expect in next year's 
budget that this might change. 
"So do senior Pentagon officials. In a late December budget decision, 
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz directed the under secretary of 
defense for acquisition, technology and logistics and the chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish an improved process to transition 
promising ACTDs to acquisition programs and bring forward a new 
spending proposal this summer for  consideration in the FY-07 budget. 
 Pentagon officials say the joint capability technology demonstration effort 
is designed to deliver the improved transition process Wolfowitz seeks. It 
is the brainchild of Sue  Payton, the deputy under secretary of 
defense for advanced systems and concepts, who has worked for the last 
18 months to improve the ACTD process and put in place what she calls a 
new business model for rapidly fielding new technologies desired by 
combatant commanders.  
Beginning in 1994, the ACTD program established an alternate route to 
quickly put new technologies in the hands of WarFighter. The program 
takes new but relatively mature technology and offers the services the 
opportunity to assess prototypes in a military environment. Targeted to 
address pressing requirements, ACTDs typically spend three to four years 
in development, after which a handful of prototypes are delivered to 
military units. They spend as many as two more years evaluating the 
technology for operational usefulness.  
This four- to six-year cycle is faster than the traditional acquisition cycle, 
which can take between 10 and 15 years from the concept stage to 
fielding.  
In some cases, technologies developed through ACTDs are used primarily 
by a  single service. At the end of the demonstration, the service can buy 
more of the capability or walk away from the project. Many ACTDs, 
however, are designed expressly for commanders who are seeking to 
improve the coordination and  operations of service-specific 
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technologies that weren't designed to work together. In some cases, the 
objective is to acquire a technology none of the services provides.  
Once an ACTD is complete, the four-star combatant commanders who 
sponsor them must depend on one of the services to acquire the 
technology and fund its operational use, although U.S. Special Operations 
Command has unique acquisition authority and is exempt from this rule. 
The services, however, do not always rank ACTDs desired by combatant 
commanders high in their procurement portfolios.  
"Military services and defense agencies have been reluctant to fund 
acquisition of ACTD-proven technologies, especially those focusing on 
joint requirements, because of competing priorities," the Government 
Accountability Office said in a December 2002 report.  
The Pentagon's FY-06 budget request includes $40 million to kick start a 
number of proposals aimed at correcting key difficulties that have surfaced 
in guiding new technologies from government and commercial 
laboratories to troops and into the Pentagon's acquisition and operations 
accounts.  
These funds will be spread across four new program elements to fund 
JCTDs as well as a pilot program to establish a new defense acquisition 
executive.  
This new position would share rank with the service acquisition executives 
and be the primary advocate in the budget process for joint capabilities 
that do not have a  natural place in any of the service accounts.  
Key to the new approach is a change in how projects are funded. In order 
to remain as responsive to the current needs of combatant commanders, 
the Pentagon keeps ACTDs out of its planning, programming and budget 
execution cycle, which involves a two-year delay between requesting and 
receiving funds.  
"So every time an ACTD starts, if a service has not already been planning, 
you have to break [another] program" to find the money for the new 
project, said Peterson. The net effect: "We create an instant unfunded 
requirement," he said.  
Under the JCTD approach, the Office of the Secretary of Defense will 
provide more funds at the beginning of a project, boosting its start-up 
contribution from 30 percent to at least 50 percent in order to reduce the 
pressure on the services to  find money for the project outside of the 
budget cycle.  
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The JCTD process will set shorter time lines for demonstrating new 
concepts or  technologies.  
"We would like to make that quicker by at least a year," said Peterson.  
The JCTD strategy will require a final demonstration in two to three years, 
faster than the three-year to four-year goals for most ACTDs. In the first 
year, JCTD officials will be required to deliver a preliminary capability.  
After that, they must be 50 percent complete by the end of the second year 
and wrap up in the third year. Payton also wants 80 percent of JCTDs to 
transition at least half of their products into a permanent place in the 
Pentagon's budget.  
The following are some examples of FY06 ACTDs and JCTDs. These 
ACTD/JCTDs have the potential to support COCOM missions, whether or 
not they evolve into full-fledged programs of record. For a full list of 
ACTDs and JCTDs, refer to Appendix A and the following web link. 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/actd/descript.htm 
Agile Global Combat Support (ARGCS) 
Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA) JCTD 
CHAMPION (Counter Intelligence-Human Intelligence Advanced 
Modernization Program/Intelligence Operations Now) JCTD 
 Extended Space Sensors Architecture (ESSA) 
 Joint Modular Intermodal Distribution System (JMIDS) JCTD 
 Large Data JCTD 
 Multi-service Advanced Sensors to Counter Obscured Targets 
(MASCOT) 
 Joint Enable Theater Access (JETA) 
Event Management Framework (EMF) 




At the conclusion of the ACTD operational demonstration, there are three 
possible outcomes. 
First, recommend acquisition of the technology. 
Second, if the capability or system does not demonstrate military utility, 
the project is terminated or returned to the technology base. 
Third, the Warfighter’s need is fully satisfied by the fielded prototype 
capability that remained onboard and there is no need to acquire additional 
units. 
 ACTD/JCTD Transition Process  
Figure 2 below outlines possible paths which the ACTD in review might 
follow as it transitions to a program of record. 
 
Alternatives Following Completion of ACTD (From Ref. ACTD 2004). 
Transition to the formal Defense acquisition process will be necessary 
when development or production is required. The acquisition category will 
depend on both the number and cost of systems required to meet the 
military need. The next step is to determine at what point does the ACTD 
enters the acquisition process. If significantly more development of the 
technology is required, the system might enter into the development 
portion of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) 
phase. On the other hand, if the capability of the ACTD is sufficient and 
needed promptly, entering into the Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 
portion of EMD is an option. 
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There are three generic classes of ACTDs that present significantly 
different transition challenges: 
a. Class I ACTD. These are typically informational systems with special 
purpose software operating on commercial workstations. They frequently 
are required in small quantities, and that requirement can be satisfied 
without further development or production using the residual ACTD 
system (residual ACTD systems are the systems used during the ACTD 
that are left behind with the WarFighter to meet his military need) or a few 
additional systems [ACTD 2004]. 
b. Class II ACTDs. These are weapon or sensor systems similar in concept 
to systems that are acquired through the formal acquisition process. In 
some cases a Class II ACTD will be planned ahead of time to transition 
into LRIP following ACTD, but at other times it is appropriate to plan for 
additional development following the ACTD [ACTD 2004]. 
c. Class III ACTDs. These ACTDs are best described as “systems of 
systems.” This means that an individual element within the overall system 
of a Class III ACTD may be a fielded system, a system already in 
acquisition, or a system emerging from the technology base. The overall 
ACTD may involve multiple Program Executive Officers (PEO), and 
perhaps multiple Military Departments. The challenge here is to integrate 
and coordinate the individual transitions to achieve the capability 




Classes of ACTDs (From Ref. ACTD 2004) (p15-22). 
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APPENDIX B. ASSUMPTIONS FROM WR-ALC ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 
A. ASSUMPTIONS  
a.  Program Year:  FY 2009.  (Source:  Walter Blount, Electronic Engineer, 402 
EMXG/MXVOPE, DSN 468-5431).   
b.  The analysis period is 10 years.  (Source:  Walter Blount, Electronic Engineer, 
402 EMXG/MXVOPE, DSN 468-5431).   
c.  All costs will be expressed in FY05 constant (base year) dollars, unless stated 
otherwise.  (Source:  Walter Blount, Electronic Engineer, 402 EMXG/MXVOPE, DSN 
468-5431).   
d.  USAF Raw Inflation Indices are used to adjust all historical cost to FY09 
dollars.  (Source:  USAF Raw Inflation Indices issued by SAF/FMC on 3 Feb 05)                                      
e.  All costs are discounted using a “middle-of-year” discount convention. The 
real discount rate is 2.5 percent (for 7 thru 10 years analysis period).  (Source:  
SAF/FMCE, Discount Rates for Economic Analysis, Revised 9 Feb 05) 
f.   The number of personnel will remain the same.  (Source:  Walter Blount, 
Electronic Engineer, 402 EMXG/MXVOPE, DSN 468-5431).   
g.  Terminal value will be negligible for all alternatives.  (Source:  Walter Blount, 
Electronic Engineer, 402 EMXG/MXVOPE, DSN 468-5431).   
h.  There are no Research and Development costs associated with either 
alternative.  (Source:  Walter Blount, Electronic Engineer, 402 EMXG/MXVOPE, DSN 
468-5431). 
i.   The investment in the software translation tool for Alternative B is estimated 
to cost $1,000,000 (FY05$) (Source:  Walter Blount, Electronic Engineer, 402 
EMXG/MXVOPE, DSN 468-5431).   
j.  New Equipment Re-host Costs:  
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Current Re-host Procedure: The labor cost to re-host a Test Program Set (TPS) is 
estimated at $100,000 (FY05$) per set.  A total of 171 TPSs will be re-hosted beginning 
in FY 2010.  (Source:  Walter Blount, Electronic Engineer, 402 EMXG/MXVOPE, DSN 
468-5431).   
New Re-host Procedure: Based on savings expected by use of the new software 
translation tool, the cost of the new re-host procedure is estimated at $48,000 (FY05$) for 
each TPS.  (Source:  Bob Pennington, 402 SMXG/MXDEG, Inc DSN 468-1307)  
k.  The purchase price of an Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) station is $700,000 
(FY08$).  The purchase of 22 ATE stations is scheduled for FY 2010.  (Source:  Larry 
Smith, 402 EMXG/MXVOPE, DSN 468-5456). 
B. MAINTENANCE COSTS PER YEAR  
Current Equipment:  The test stations in MAI are maintained by either contract 
support or organic support.  For this analysis, an average of the two methods was used.  
MAIPE is responsible for handling test station contracts for MAIE.  The average contract 
cost per test station is $40,000 per year.  Some contracts are more expensive and some 
are less expensive.  (Source:  Larry Smith, 402 EMXG/MXVOPE, 468-5456)  The 
estimated average downtime per test station is 30% or 600 hrs per year, which equates to 
an organic maintenance cost of $60,000 per year.  Considering both contract and organic 
repair, the annual average maintenance cost is $50,000 per test station.  The maintenance 
cost for the old test stations is $2,200,000 per year.   
New Equipment:  Based on the speed and new technology of the new test stations, 
1 new test station can replace 2 old test stations.  For this project, 22 new test stations, 
will replace 44 old test stations.  The maintenance cost on a new test station is $20,000 
per year based on a current contract.  Therefore, the maintenance cost of the 22 new test 
stations is $440,000 per year.  (Source:  Walter Blount, Electronic Engineer, 402 
EMXG/MXVOPE, DSN 468-5431). 
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a. Electrical Power Consumption: 
Current Equipment:  The annual electrical power cost for a Digital Test Station 
DTS-70 is $2,600.  (Source: Jim Bond, MAIPF, DSN 468-9622)  The electrical power 
cost for the old test stations is $114,400 per year. 
New Equipment:  The new test stations are smaller and require approximately half 
the power of the old test stations, which equates to $1,300 per year per test station.  Based 
on the speed and new technology of the new test stations, 1 new test station can replace 2 
old test stations.  The purchase of 22 new test stations will replace 44 old test stations.  
The cost for the new test stations is estimated at $28,600 per year.  (Source:  Walter 
Blount, Electronic Engineer, 402 EMXG/MXVOPE, DSN 468-5431).   
b. Calibration: 
Current Equipment:  Calibration for an old test station cost approximately $3,000 
per 6-month cycle or $6,000 per year.  (Source: Tony Hamlett, 402 EMXG/MXVOPE, 
DSN 468-2514)  The calibration cost for the old test stations is $264,000 per year. 
New Equipment:  Calibration of a new test station should only cost around $2,000 
per year.  Based on the speed and new technology of the new test stations, 1 new test 
station can replace 2 old test stations.  The purchase of 22 new test stations will replace 
44 old test stations.  The cost for the new test stations is estimated at $44,000 per year.  
(Source:  Walter Blount, Electronic Engineer, 402 EMXG/MXVOPE, DSN 468-5431).   
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